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The paper analyzes the relation between monetary uncertainty and government incentives to 
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reforms. I relate this result to the debate about central bank setup in a larger monetary union. 
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1. Introduction 
Faced with the enlargement of the monetary union to new member states, many officials and 
part of the literature argue that a successful integration of the new members requires their 
nominal and real convergence to present member states. A monetary union with members too 
diverse will make the task of the European Central Bank, the ECB, more difficult and 
member states more vulnerable to shocks because monetary policy cannot react to national 
idiosyncratic shocks. Therefore, central bankers stress, individual economies must become 
more flexible in response to economic shocks.
1 Optimists thus expect that European Monetary 
Union (EMU) will lead to more flexibility when governments realize the loss of monetary 
policy as an alternative adjustment instrument. Pessimists do not necessarily expect this to 
happen and are skeptical concerning in particular the prospects of larger member states in 
terms of growth and employment. Does monetary union, and particularly its extension to new 
member states, lead to more or less reforms? 
Another issue that is important for the extension of monetary union, and that has raised 
a lot of attention among policymakers, is the question of how to deal with the new members 
in the larger ECB council. The council, at present comprising twelve representatives of 
member states and six representatives of the ECB, is already deemed too large, and it is hard 
to imagine how 20 or more members should be able to find a consensus in adequate time. 
Moreover, the extension is likely to make ECB decisions less predictable. Not only a 
deliberate opaqueness in the communication of the ECB could lead to less “transparency” but 
the extension of the council is likely to create all kinds to interaction among members that are 
hard to predict and will thus reduce the predictability of ECB behavior.
2 The more new 
                                                 
1 This is, of course, the perspective of the optimum currency area literature, looking for 
alternative adjustment mechanisms when giving up national monetary policy.  
2 The concept of transparency used here refers to “preference” uncertainty. For a recent 
discussion, see Hughes Hallett and Libich (2006). 2 
members there are the more likely it is that uncertainty increases in the present decision 
making structure.  
Based on efficiency and transparency grounds, it has therefore been argued that the 
ECB’s decision structure be transformed upon enlargement. Several proposals have been 
discussed but the one adopted by the Council of Ministers (against the objection of the 
European Parliament) is a model that has different groups of countries (ordered by their 
relative sizes) within which group members rotate. Larger countries will be more often 
entitled to vote than smaller members.
3  
In this paper, I bring together the aspects of economic reforms and monetary policy with 
the structure of decision making in the monetary union. I ask whether monetary policy is 
likely to make countries more or less willing to implement reforms. I distinguish between 
structural distortions that reduce growth (such as taxation and the presence of monopolies) 
and measures that increase the flexibility of the economy and its capacity to deal with 
economic shocks (such as labor and product market regulation). I show that the introduction 
of a monetary union will tend to have different effects on market flexibility and structural 
reforms. All governments have an incentive to make their economies more flexible with 
respect to economic shocks. They realize the common central bank will no longer react as 
strongly to stabilize economic shocks in the domestic economy as the national central bank 
did. To counter this effect, economies must become more flexible. This effect is strongest for 
small economies. 
The response of governments to monetary union with respect to structural reforms, 
however, is very different. Like earlier literature (see next section), I find that governments 
have, per se, less incentives to reduce structural distortions in a monetary union. This is 
                                                 
3 It is hard to justify this agreement on economic grounds. Criteria for grouping countries 
should be the similarity of economic structures and not the economic size. 3 
particularly the case for highly distorted large economies. Small economies that are little 
distorted are induced to implement more reforms. Monetary union is thus likely to lead to a 
further polarization between more and less distorted economies, making the conduct of 
monetary policy presumably even more difficult. 
However, negative effects can be compensated because uncertainty about the central 
bank’s reaction function increases reforms. Thus, since the extension of the monetary union 
will, at least initially, create more uncertainty governments may become more reform minded. 
It also implies that maximizing transparency about the central bank’s reaction function is not 
necessarily good for the economy. There are many reasons for increasing transparency but I 
show that there is also a case for deliberately keeping the reaction function of the central bank 
uncertain to some degree. 
Because uncertainty about the central bank’s reaction function is presumably a function 
of the political weights of different countries, the results have implications for the central 
bank structure. If new members will get only little political weight uncertainty is likely to 
increase only moderately and vice versa. Highly centralized decision making in the monetary 
union might therefore have less beneficial consequences than is often argued and the present 
“one country, one vote” system might not be so bad from the point of view of reforms, even if 
it is not fully efficient. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 relates the present paper to the literature. 
Section 3 explores the relation between economic reforms and uncertainty for a closed 
economy. Sections 4 and 5 discuss monetary union, and section 6 concludes. 
 
2. The Literature 
The paper is related to several strings in the literature. First, I draw on the discussion about 
economic reforms and monetary union. Calmfors (2001) and Sibert and Sutherland (2000) 4 
argued that monetary union will lead countries to being less reform willing than under 
monetary autarchy. The reason is that monetary policy and economic reforms are partial 
substitutes. The more reforms there are, the higher is output (or the lower is unemployment) 
and the less reason there is for active monetary policy in order to lower unemployment or 
increase output. Thus, inflation-averse governments have an incentive to decrease 
distortionary regulation in order to keep inflation low. In a monetary union the central bank 
will react less strongly to developments in a single country. The inflationary response to 
distortions is lower and therefore governments can run a more distionary policy without 
fearing inflation. Hence, a monetary union reduces governments’ reform willingness. I 
partially confirm this effect in my model, but point out that this is not necessarily true for 
countries that join a monetary union with countries that are more distorted than they are 
themselves. In order to avoid an increase in inflation less distorted countries increase their 
reforms (Hefeker 2005). 
The second literature that I draw on is the huge literature on the influence of monetary 
policy uncertainty (Brainard 1967, Söderström 2002). However, most of the literature deals 
with the consequences of uncertainty on the central bank’s policy, showing that monetary 
authorities tend to be more careful if faced with parameter uncertainty, such as the transition 
of monetary policy. Here, the focus is on how uncertainty about the central bank’s behavior 
will influence domestic agents. This issue has been explored in the literature on central bank 
transparency (see Eijffinger and Hoeberichts 2000, Winkler 2000, Geraats 2002, Carpenter 
2004 for surveys). The question whether transparency is beneficial is usually analyzed in 
relation with the private sector, where several authors have pointed out that some degree of 
opaqueness and “creative ambiguity” can be beneficial for the economy (Cukierman and 
Meltzer 1986). Whereas earlier literature has focused on the influence of uncertainty on wage 
setters (Sorensen 1991, Grüner 2002), I analyze how governments react to such uncertainty. 5 
More uncertainty makes governments more careful and leads them to reduce structural 
distortions and to make the economy more flexible. 
The third string that I relate to is the literature on the design of the common central bank 
which mainly deals with efficiency issues and the need to reform the ECB council because of 
the large number of members (Baldwin et al. 2002, Berger 2002, Meade and Sheets 2002, 
Ullrich 2004). Most of these authors argue that because of efficiency considerations it is 
highly unlikely that an even larger ECB council will be able to make efficient and speedy 
policy decisions. Moreover, it is often argued that it can be expected that national 
representatives vote with a national perspectives. This implies that new member states will 
distort the ECB’s decision, given that many of these countries are economically small but 
politically overrepresented (Berger 2004). Therefore, they might unduly influence the 
common central bank’s policy and lead to an inefficient policy from a European wide 




3. Policy Choices in the Closed Economy  
3.1. The Model 
This section develops the underlying model and describes the interaction between a domestic 
government and a national central bank. Against this benchmark the case of monetary union 
will be compared. The following model is on Sibert and Sutherland (2001).  
Output  i y  is a positive function of surprise inflation 
e
i i π − π  where 
e
i π  is the subjective 
expected rate of inflation of the private sector. Output is decreasing in structural distortions 
i τ , such as distortionary taxation, the presence of monopolies, tariff protection, the impact of 
                                                 
4 Another positive effect of a larger decision making body could be that more information is 
processed, thus allowing for better decisions (for a survey of these arguments, see Gerling et 
al. 2005).  6 




5 Moreover, the economy may be hit by exogenous shocks  i ε , with 
( )
2
i , 0 N ~ ε σ ε , whose effect on output is given as  i i i g ε γ = . Making the economy more 
flexible by reducing labor and product market regulation can help the economy to adjust more 
quickly and thus cushion part of the shock.
6 The lower the level of such regulations  i γ , the 
lower will be the impact of exogenous developments and shocks. We hence have  
 




i g y y i i − τ − π − π + = .  (1)
 
Clearly, the first best situation would be reached if  i γ  and  i τ  could be reduced to zero. 
However, it is assumed that the economy is starting out with given levels of distortions,  i γ  
and  i τ  and that deregulation is politically costly for the government. Abolishing labor market 
regulation might lead to protests, reducing structural distortions might prompt firms to threat a 
loss of jobs, and the reduction of taxes might imply the government is no longer able to 
finance pet projects. More regulation instead might lead to protests by employers and scare 
away foreign investors. Therefore, any changes to the given level of  i γ  and  i τ  risk to alienate 
one or several interest groups. The political costs are increasing in deviations of  i γ  and  i τ  
from  i γ and  i τ ; they are assumed as  ( )
2
i i i C τ − τ φ = τ
τ  and  ( )
2
i i i C γ − γ φ = γ
γ . The relative loss of 
government from these policy measures are given as  γ φ  and  τ φ  respectively. For simplicity, I 
assume that utility parameters are equal for all governments. This is not necessarily a very 
                                                 
5  i τ  should be thought of as a vector of different policy measures and not one single policy. 
6 On the possible relations between the two types of reforms, see Berger and Danninger 
(2005). 7 
realistic assumption but helps to focus on the economics of the model by abstracting from the 
influence of preferences. 
Apart from wishing to minimize the political costs of reforms, the government aims to 
keep inflation close to zero and to avoid deviations of output from the distortion free level. Its 
loss function is  
 
[] ( ) [ ]




i i C C y y E L E.   (2)
 
The objective function of the monetary authority is akin to the government’s 
preferences but without the losses stemming from economic reform. Independent central 
banks are not elected into office, much less exposed to public resistance against policies and 
unlikely to be made responsible for economic reforms. Thus, the central bank is only 
concerned with the output gap and inflation. Another difference is that the preference 
parameter  i λ  of the national central bank might be different from those of the government. 






i i y y V − λ + π = .  (3)
 
I assume that the central bank sets its policy when possible uncertainties have been 
resolved. This reflects the standard timing in this type of model, where it is assumed that the 
central bank sets its policy after stochastic shocks have realized, but where government and 
private sector react before uncertainties have been dissolved. The formal time structure is thus 
given as: (i) the government sets the levels of regulation  i γ  and  i τ , (ii) the private sector 
forms its expectations about inflation 
e
i π  based on the policy choices of the government, (iii) 8 
the shock  i ε  is realized, (iv) the central bank sets inflation  i π . The game structure is 
Stackelberg. The government is the Stackelberg leader taking into account how the central 
bank is likely to react to its policy choices. The private sector plays Nash against the 
government and the central bank. This reflects the idea that monetary policy follows after 
reform policies have been determined and that monetary policy can (to some degree) be 
foreseen by the government.  
 
3.1. Uncertainty and Reforms 
The model is solved by backward induction. The central bank’s reaction is derived first. 
Optimization of the monetary authority’s loss function with respect to inflation yields: 
 
( ) i i i
e
i i i ε γ + τ + π θ = π .  (4)
 
() i i i 1 / λ + λ = θ  is the reaction parameter of the central bank which is obviously 
increasing in the relative weight it puts on stabilizing output  i λ . Depending on the 
transparency of a single central bank, and especially if the central bank is run by a collegiate 
body, it could be that the central bank’s reaction is not perfectly predictable by the private 
sector. The private sector will certainly form expectations about how the central bank reacts to 
economic developments, such as commodity price shocks, fiscal policy changes or wages, but 
the central bank’s reaction will, in general, not be perfectly predictable.
7 This uncertainty is 
likely to be larger the larger is the governing body and if new persons enter the central bank’s 
decision making structure. The extension of the monetary union is a case where the central 
                                                 
7 In fact, the standard assumption that the central bank’s reaction can be predicted accurately 
might be a less realistic case than the assumption that there is some noise in the central bank’s 
reaction. 9 
bank’s reaction function will be more uncertain than it is before enlargement. In terms of the 
model, this is represented by the fact that  i θ  can be stochastic. I assume  ( )
2
i , N ~ θ σ θ θ  if  i θ  is 
stochastic and hence  0
2 = σθ  for a fully predictable central bank.
8 
Since government and private sector determine their action simultaneously, I consider 
next the government. The government optimizes its structural reforms and the ability of the 
economy to digest shocks by taking the expected reaction of the central bank into account.  
The level of structural distortions remaining after reforms is  
 
( ) ( )
() () Θ + θ − λ + φ














2 2 1 θ σ λ + + θ = Θ  with  []λ = λi E  and  [ ] θ = θi E . 
The level of distortions set by the government is obviously higher the higher are initial 
distortions  i τ  and government aversion to reforms  τ φ . It is decreasing in expected inflation 
because expected inflation pushes up actual inflation. In order to keep inflation to a moderate 
level, the government reacts to higher expected inflation with more reforms. The more 
uncertain is the reaction of the central bank (captured by Θ ), the more cautious is the 
government and the more reforms are implemented. 
The amount of rigidity, remaining after reforms, is given as  
 
                                                 
8 Thus uncertainty refers to the central bank’s preferences, as in Canzoneri (1985) and 
Cukierman and Meltzer (1986). An alternative way to model non-transparency is a non-





i 1 ε γ
γ
σ Θ + θ − λ + φ
γ φ
= γ . 
(5)
 
It is increasing in the initial level of rigidity  i γ  and the aversion against flexibility  γ φ  
and decreasing in the variability of the economic shock  i ε , reflecting the fact that the 
government will make the economy more flexible if the variability of economic shocks is 
high. The uncertainty about the central bank’s reaction and the variability of economic shocks 
reinforce each other. 
Assuming rational expectations, the expectations of the private sector are  
 
[]
() () () Θ + θ − λ + φ θ −
τ θφ











In contrast to the standard argument that expected inflation is falling in the central 
bank’s transparency (van der Cruijsen and Demertzis 2005), I find that expected inflation is 
decreasing in uncertainty. The simple reason is that uncertainty is reform increasing which 
leads the private to expect a less active monetary policy. 
With these expectations, the amount of structural reforms in equilibrium is  
 
( )
() () () Θ + θ − λ + φ θ −











Both types of distortions are thus decreasing in the amount of uncertainty about the 
central bank’s reaction parameter to economic developments. The higher is the uncertainty the 
more the government will attempt to make the economy less vulnerable to shocks and to 
lower structural distortions in the economy. Thus, uncertainty is beneficial for inflation and 11 
output because the government’s action have a direct positive impact on economic 
performance and an improvement in the economic performance reduces incentives to use 
monetary policy to boost output. Moreover, a more flexible economy requires less active 
monetary policy in response to shocks.  
The rate of inflation will therefore result as  
 









σ Θ + θ − λ + φ
γ φ
+















4. Policy Choices in the Monetary Union 
Having established the case of a single economy and the interaction between uncertainty and 
economic reforms, the question is how this is transformed in a monetary union. As argued 
above, uncertainty concerning the reaction function of the central bank is arguably more 
relevant in the case of the EMU, and particular so with the prospect of enlargement. There are 
at present 12 national representatives of member states and a board comprising additional six 
members. Extending this body to additional members will make decision making in the EMU 
more cumbersome and presumably less predictable than today.
9 Extension means that new 
members will be added whose preferences are mostly unknown and who might shift the 
policy stance of the ECB. The interaction of a larger group of individuals in collective 
decision making might lead to an outcome that is different from what the smaller ECB 
council had decided.
10 Especially in the initial years it is thus likely that the larger central 
                                                 
9 Ten new members joined the union in May 2004, of which seven have already joined the 
ERM II (a pre-entry qualification for EMU membership). Slovenia is scheduled to become the 
first new member of EMU by January 2007 and others will follow shortly afterwards. 
10 Goldberg and Klein (2005) show that the perception of the ECB’s reaction parameter has 
changed over time as markets developed a view of the ECB’s characteristics and the relative 
weight it assigns to different objectives. 12 
bank council will create more uncertainty than before. Given that markets need some time to 
assess the preferences of policymakers (which has also happened with the initial group of 
monetary policymakers in the ECB, see Goldberg and Klein 2005), they might expect new 
members will bring different preferences to the ECB board. Even if markets expect that new 
members have similar preferences to older members,  [ ] λ = λ = λ 1 2 E , there might be some 
variance around this expected value at least for an initial period. 
Moreover, it is likely that uncertainty will be larger if the voting power of the new 
members is large. First, the larger the relative size of the newcomers in respect to the older 
members, the higher their relative influence. This is obvious if monetary policy is a weighted 
average of individually preferred policies, but also if monetary policy is determined by the 
median voter, different preferences of newcomers shift the median’s position (Hefeker 2003). 
Finally, even if monetary policy is set by consensus, as the ECB claims it is, new members 
will have more influence the larger is their group. Therefore the amount of uncertainty created 
is arguably a positive function of the relative voting weight of the new members.
11 
To keep matters simple, I consider a monetary union built of two countries only. Let 
country 1 represent the current members of the EMU and country 2 represent the new 
members. I assume  1 s s 2 1 = +  and  1 z z 2 1 = +  where  i s  is the relative economic weight of the 
two regions and  i z  is their relative political weight. Since it is possible that the newer 
members receive a larger political weight in the ECB council than they have in economic 
terms,  2 2 s z > , I allow political and economic weights to differ. In fact, if the present “one 
country, one vote” principle is extended to the new members they would be significantly 
over-represented politically (Berger 2002). Even if the proposed changes to the voting 
structure ECB are implemented (see Ullrich 2004), which would lead to some reduction in the 
                                                 
11 Fatum (2006) instead argues that any ECB council is likely to adopt the preferred position 
of the most conservative member and will thus reflect the Bundesbank’s preferred policy. 13 
political power of the smaller members, they will continue to have more political than 
economic weight. But even if the ECB monetary policy would be completely centralized, a 
political weight of zero would not imply an economic weight of zero. Even if new members 
do not have a say in the monetary policy, developments in those regions will be taken into 
account with the relative weight  2 s .
12  
The objective function of the larger central bank is therefore  
 




1 1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 1
MU y y s y y s z z s s V − + − λ + λ + π + π = .  (9)
 
The ECB’s policy follows from optimizing (9) as  
 
() 2 2 2 1 1 1 2 2 1 1
e s s s s ˆ ε γ + ε γ + τ + τ + π θ = π ,  (10)
 
where  2 2 1 1 z z ˆ θ + θ = θ  and  [ ] θ = θ ˆ E . The rate of inflation is equal in both regions and I hence 
abstract from asymmetric developments in the rate of inflation due, for instance, to the 
influence of the Balassa-Samuelson effect. Therefore, expected inflation is also the same in 
both regions. To keep matters simple, I also assume  ( ) 0 , Cov 2 1 = ε ε  and equal variance of 
shocks in the two regions of the monetary union. 
The common central bank reacts to developments in any single member state according 
to its economic weight, thus neglecting asymmetric national developments or differences in 
the transmission of monetary policy (Benigno 2004). Developments in larger countries will 
hence be taken more into account than developments in smaller countries. This applies to 
                                                 
12 The assumption is hence that the ECB council members have a European and not national 
perspective. 14 
structural distortions,  i τ , as well as to shocks  i ε  and to the economies’ flexibility in reaction 
to shocks  i γ .  
Although there is a now a common central bank, I assume that governments’ policies 
remain uncoordinated and that the national governments decide about their reform efforts 
without consulting other governments. This is an adequate assumption for the European 
Monetary Union as of now, despite some tentative attempts by the Commission to coordinate 
member states’ policies in the framework of the Lisbon objectives and the Broad Economic 
Policy Guidelines.  
Following the same steps as above, structural distortions and flexibility after reforms are  
 
() ( ) ( ) [ ]
() () () () ()() () () () [] θ − λ + φ + θ − λ + φ Θ + θ − λ + φ θ − λ + φ θ −
τ Θ − Θ + θ − λ + φ θ − τ
⋅ φ = τ











i s 1 s s 1 s s 1 s 1 1
s s s s 1 1
 









i s s 1 ε γ
γ
σ Θ + θ − λ + φ
γ φ
= γ        2 , 1 j , i = , j i ≠ , 
(12)
 
where  () ( ) θ − λ > θ − λ 1 s 1 i  for all  1 si < .  
Like in the case of monetary autonomy, flexibility is determined through the initial 
degree of distortions, the aversion to reforms, the variability of economic shocks and the 
variability of the central bank’s reaction function. As before, it follows that shocks and 
uncertainty are both reform inducing. Because of the assumption that shocks are uncorrelated, 
flexibility is only affected by the national degree of distortions and independent of those in 
the other country.  15 
The case of structural distortions is more complicated. First, structural reforms are 
strategic substitutes. The higher the initial distortions in the other country, the more incentives 
there are for the government to lower its own distortions. In order to avoid that the higher 
distortions in the other country create too much inflation, the domestic government has an 
incentive to implement more reforms itself. As before, the initial level of structural distortions 
in the home country,  i τ  increases the level of distortions after reforms. Second, the influence 





. That is, distortions will 
decrease with monetary uncertainty. 
The rate of inflation in EMU follows as  
 
() () ( ) ( ) []
() ( ) () ( ) ()( ) () ( ) () [] θ − λ + φ + θ − λ + φ Θ + θ − λ + φ θ − λ + φ θ −
τ θ − λ + φ + τ θ − λ + φ φ
⋅ θ = π







2 2 2 1 1 1
s 1 s s 1 s s 1 s 1 1
s s 1 s s 1 ˆ  









σ Θ + θ − λ + φ
γ φ
+ ε

















1 s s 1
s
s s 1
s ˆ . 
(13)
 
It is a function of the relative weights of the two countries and depends on whether their 
flexibility and structural distortions will increase or decrease (which is considered in the next 
section). Expected inflation, however, is only a question of initial structural distortions and 
can thus readily be compared to the expected inflation in each country before monetary union. 
[ ] [ ]
MU N
i E E π > π , where the superscripts N and MU refer to monetary autonomy and monetary 
union respectively, requires that  
 
() ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ]> − Θ + θ − λ + φ θ − λ + φ τ τ τ i j j i s s s 1 1 
() ( ) () [] ( ) ( ) θ − λ + φ Θ + θ − λ + φ θ − τ τ τ i j s 1 1 1.  
(14)16 
 
Thus, a single country can expect a fall in the rate of inflation if it enters a monetary 
union with a country that is sufficiently less distorted than the country itself. In this case, 
monetary discipline is imported because the lower distortions in that country lead the 
common central bank to run a less inflationary policy than the national central bank did 
because of these structural distortions. The positive effect of reducing inflation is increasing 
in the relative economic size of the less distorted country  i j s s > .  
 
5. The Influence of Monetary Union on Reforms 
As I have argued above, the case of uncertainty is most relevant for the monetary union 
because in the initial years after enlargement, a larger policy making organ is likely to create 
more uncertainty. I will hence assume that uncertainty under national autonomy is zero 
0
2 N
i = σ γ θ  whereas it is positive in the monetary union  0
2 MU
i > σ γ θ .  




i γ > γ , is  
 
( ) ( ) j i
2 2 2 2
i s s s − θ > σ + θ θ ,  (15)
 
and it is always fulfilled. Even if setting  0
2 = σθ  the condition simplifies to  () 0 s 1 s i j
2 > − θ  by 




i γ = γ .  
The creation of a monetary union leads countries to implement measures to become 
more flexible and increase their ability to cope with economic shocks. This incentive is 
increased if monetary union leads to more uncertainty concerning the reaction of the common 
central bank. However, even if this is not the case, countries have an incentive to become 
more flexible because they realize the common central bank will care less for idiosyncratic 17 
shocks that hit single countries. Therefore, the only alternative instrument to cope with such 
shocks is to make the economy more flexible and less vulnerable to such shocks. Monetary 
union serves as an engine for more reforms.  
Next, I compare the levels of structural distortion under monetary union  0
2 MU
i > σ τ θ  and 
under monetary autonomy  0
2 N
i = σ τ θ . From (7) and (11), one finds that EMU leads to a 




i τ > τ , if  
 
() ( ) () ( ) ( ) [ ] i i j
2
i j j i
2 s s 1 1 s s τ − τ θ + τ − τ θ − λ + φ θ − θ τ  
()( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) [ ] 0 s s s s s s 1 1 s 1 i i j
2
j i j j i i j i
2 > τ − τ θ + τ + τ θ − λ + φ θ − σ λ + + τ θ . 
(16)
 
I analyze the condition in parts. For the case without uncertainty (so that  0
2 = σθ ) it is 
possible to show the condition is only fulfilled if  i j τ > τ . That is, countries will reduce their 
distortions if they lower distortions than their partners in the monetary union while countries 
that are more distorted experience a further deterioration of their structural distortions. Hence, 
some countries will experience an increase in structural distortions while others see their 
distortions fall. Since the second part of the condition (multiplied by 
2
θ σ ) is always positive it 
follows that uncertainty can, at least partially, compensate for the negative effect of  i j τ < τ . A 
high enough degree of uncertainty is an incentive for all countries to implement more 
structural reforms, even for those that would not implement them without uncertainty. 
The intuition of the result is straightforward. As has been shown in the earlier literature, 
for instance by Calmfors (2001) and Sibert and Sutherland (2000), if structural reforms and 
monetary policy are considered as substitutes by the government, and if the government is a 
Stackelberg leader with respect to the central bank, governments implement structural reforms 18 
to reduce inflationary pressure that arises because the central bank uses monetary policy to 
lower structural unemployment (which is, of course, in vain—reflecting the standard inflation 
bias (Barro and Gordon 1983)). Because a monetary union implies that the central bank will 
no longer react as strongly to distortions in the home country as the national central bank 
before monetary union, inflationary pressure automatically declines and this prompts the 
reform-averse government to reduce its reform efforts. 
Hefeker (2005) has demonstrated that this result can be turned around if the assumption 
of symmetric countries is given up. Countries that are more distorted will reduce their reform 
efforts, as demonstrated in the earlier literature, but the less distorted countries fear the 
“import” of inflation and are more concerned to reduce this pressure by implementing even 
more reforms. Hence, asymmetric monetary unions are likely to see a further polarization of 
structural unemployment in the monetary union. 
This negative consequence for some of the members of the larger EMU, however, can 
be avoided if the common central bank is less open and transparent than national central 
banks. By deliberately creating uncertainty about its reaction function, structural distortions 
can be reduced even in countries that are relatively more distorted. While it certainly not easy 
to deliberately create uncertainty, the conclusion at least is that maximum transparency in the 
larger central bank could have negative effects for those member countries that enter 
monetary union relatively more distorted. 
 
6. Conclusion 
The paper has demonstrated the beneficial, that is, reform inducing effects of uncertainty 
about the central bank’s reaction function. While this does not invalidate the general positive 
effects of central bank transparency, clear policy decision and communication about them, the 
paper stresses that there can also be positive effects of preference uncertainty. In a closed 19 
economy, uncertainty leads governments to implement more structural reforms and to try to 
make the economy less vulnerable to economic shocks. 
In the case of monetary union, it follows that all governments have an incentive to make 
their economies more flexible in order to be able to compensate for less stabilizing influence 
of the central bank. Since the central bank will react the least to the smallest economies their 
incentives to become more flexible in a monetary union are largest. This would predict that 
the new member states of the EMU will be more flexible in the monetary union than the 
larger (and older) member states. This might be one possible explanation (among others) why 
in general smaller economies are more flexible than larger ones, and why the difference in 
these matters between larger and smaller economies has further increased since the start of 
EMU. 
The probability that monetary union will also lead to a reduction in structural distortions 
in member countries is less uniform. Only those countries that have relatively low distortions 
will reduce their distortions further, whereas those that have levels of distortions are likely to 
undertake less efforts to lower them. Monetary union, according to this model, will hence lead 
to a further polarization of high and low distortion countries. However, the uncertainty 
created by the introduction (or extension) of monetary union can potentially counteract this 
negative influence for high distortion countries.  
This has also implications for the relative weights that countries should have in a 
monetary union. If increasing the relative weight of newcomers will lead to more uncertainty 
about the reaction of the central bank than this is something that should not necessarily be 
avoided. There is hence some justification for the “one country, one vote” principle that the 
ECB applies to its decision making structure. A full centralization, as has been advocated by 
some observers, could be less beneficial than is often claimed even if leading to more efficient 
decision making. If having more members in the decision making process increases 20 
uncertainty, this ambiguity need not only have negative consequences. Deriving the optimal 
amount of uncertainty, however, would require having a fuller model that also incorporates 
the positive effects of lower uncertainty and transparency. 
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